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The main objective of this research is the contract pricing calculation of 
distributed generation (DG) considering its interaction with the distribu­
tion company. The proposed methodology consists in modeling the DG 
energy trading using game theory concepts and bilevel programming. 
To validate the proposed methodology several tests are carried out with 
a 34 bus distribution system, changing the number and size of the DG 
units. The contract prices calculated with this methodology represent an 
equilibrium between the profit maximization pursued by the DG owner 
and the minimization of payments procured by the distribution company. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that the proposed methodology provides 
efficient incentives for both agents, providing a solution in which the DG 
and the distribution company are mutually beneficial. Furthermore, the 
location of the DG units can also be considered in the model, so that not 
only the contract price but also the equilibrium location can be found.        
Key words: Distributed generation, bilevel programming, game theory.
Resumen
El objetivo principal de esta investigación consiste en calcular los pre­
cios de contrato de la generación distribuida (GD) considerando su 
interacción con la compañía distribuidora. La metodología propuesta 
consiste en modelar la dinámica de compra y venta de energía de GD 
usando conceptos de teoría de juegos y programación binivel. Para 
validar la metodología propuesta se realizaron varias pruebas en 
un sistema de distribución de 34 barras cambiando el número y el 
tamaño de las unidades de GD.  Los precios de contrato calculados con 
esta metodología representan un equilibrio entre la maximización de 
utilidades que busca el propietario de la GD y la minimización de pagos 
que busca la empresa distribuidora. De esta forma, se concluye que la 
metodología propuesta en este artículo provee incentivos eficientes para 
ambos agentes, entregando una solución en la que la GD y la empresa 
distribuidora se benefician mutuamente. Adicionalmente, la ubicación 
de las unidades de GD también puede considerarse dentro del modelo y 
de esta manera encontrar, no solo el precio de contrato, sino también la 
ubicación de equilibrio.     
Palabras clave: Generación distribuida, programación binivel, teo­
ría de juegos.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The electricity industry restructuring, along with advances in small scale 
generation technologies, and a higher awareness of environmental issues 
are the key factors that have motivated the development of distributed 
generation (DG) in the last decade [1]. In this scenario, several studies have 
been conducted to face the new challenges imposed by the DG integration 
in the electricity grid. Such studies include modifications on power flow 
techniques to account for DG in power systems [2]-[3]; the assessment 
of DG impacts in the distribution network [4]-[5] and the optimal sitting 
and sizing of DG units [6]­[7]. Economic issues have also been the focus 
of several studies and have been widely discussed in [8] and [9]. Most 
of the studies regarding the integration of DG are developed from the 
standpoint of the distribution company. These studies are conducted in 
order to maximize the potential benefits of DG. The approach presented in 
this paper considers both, the interest of the distribution company and the 
interest of the DG owners. In this sense, we have envisaged a scenario with 
a high penetration of DG, in which different DG owners might compete to 
sell energy to the distribution company. As a result of this competition, 
the DG contract prices can be calculated using a game theory approach. 
Thus, it is considered a set of DG owners that strive to sell energy to a 
distribution company. Such situation is modeled as a non cooperative 
game in which the strategies of the DG owners are represented by the 
contract prices at which they are willing to sell their energy. Given a set 
of energy price offers, the distribution company decides over the amount 
of energy to be purchased from the DG units and the wholesale energy 
market. Such decision process is performed trough an Optimal Power 
Flow (OPF)­based dispatch, and has been developed under a bilevel 
programming framework. 
A bilevel programming problem (BPP) is composed by an inner and an 
outer optimization problem. In this case, the outer problem corresponds 
to the optimization performed by the DG owners. Every DG owner 
considers the contract prices of the other DG owners as fixed, and solves 
his own optimization problem aiming to maximize his profits. The inner 
optimization problem corresponds to the distribution company, which 
given the set of contract price offers, procures the minimization of the 
energy payments. A BPP is equivalent to a Stackelberg game defined 
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by two agents: the leader and the followers. Initially, the leader makes 
his move first, anticipating the reaction of the followers, and then, the 
followers move sequentially reacting to the leader`s strategy [10]. In this 
case, the leader is the DG owner who makes his move first providing a 
contract price offer, and the distribution company is the follower. 
The solution of the game is achieved by finding the Nash equilibrium. 
Such equilibrium is defined as a combination of strategies in which no 
player can benefit from changing his strategy unilaterally, provided that 
the other players keep their strategies unchanged. In this case, the Nash 
equilibrium is found using the specialized software GAMBIT [11], for this, 
a payoff matrix with the profits of the DG owners for each combination of 
contract price offers is built. 
The contributions of this paper are threefold:
­  It provides a game theory approach for the contract pricing evaluation 
of dispatchable distributed generation. 
­  A bilevel programming framework is developed to explicitly consider 
the reaction of the distribution company.
­  Besides contract pricing, the proposed approach can be easily expanded 
to consider the location of the DG units as part of the DG owner’s set of 
strategies. 
2.  MARKET STRUCTURE 
With the unbundled operation of electric power systems, retailers 
emerged to fill the gap between the wholesale energy market and small 
consumers. In some markets the distribution company can also play the 
role of a retailer. To meet the expected demand, the distribution company 
purchases energy from the point of interconnection with the transmission 
system, known as substation. Figure 1 illustrates the market structure 
considered in this paper. Note that, apart from the wholesale energy 
market, the distribution company can also buy energy from the DG units 
(DG1 and DG2) located within its network and owned by independent 
producers. 
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Depending on specific market rules, wholesale market prices might be 
time and space varying. In this case, the distribution company receives the 
contract price offers of DG1 and DG2 and also knows the wholesale market 
prices at substations A and B. With this information, the distribution 
company must decide on the amount of energy to be purchased from the 
wholesale electricity market and from the DG units. This decision making 
process is not trivial, since it must consider not only the price signals 
but also the impact of the DG units in the network. For example, if the 
power injected by a DG unit has a negative impact in the voltage profile 
or increases power losses significantly; then, such DG unit would not be 
dispatched, even if its contract price offer is lower than the wholesale 
market price. Conversely, if the power injected by a DG unit contributes 
to the enforcement of a voltage constraint and/or has a positive impact 
reducing power losses, then, even if the DG contract price offer is slightly 
higher than the wholesale market price, the DG unit is likely to be 
dispatched. This decision making process is performed by means of an AC 
OPF­based dispatch. 
On the other hand, DG owners are concerned with finding the contract 
price offers that would render maximum profits. For this, every DG owner 
must consider, not only the reasoning performed by the distribution 
company, but also the most likely contract price offers of the other DG 
owners. 
Figure 1. Market structure
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3. METHODOLOGY
This section describes the mathematical model of the bilevel programming 
formulation, some game theory basis, and an illustrative example.
Bilevel programming formulation
The mathematical formulation of the bilevel programming problem is 
given by the set of equations (1) to (9). The objective function given by 
equation (1) represents the maximization of profits procured by the DG 
owners, where λDGj is the contract price of DG unit j in $/MWh; cDGj is the 
production cost of DG unit j in $/MWh; PDGj (t) is the active power supplied 
by the DG unit j in period t in MW; ∆t is the length of the time interval t in 
hours; T is the set of time intervals and J is the set of indices of DG units. 
The objective function, given by equation (2), represents the minimization 
of energy payments procured by the distribution company, where K is the 
set of substations and ρSEk (t) is the wholesale energy price at substation k 
in period t in $/MWh. Such minimization is in turn, subject to constraints 
(3)-(9). Equations (3) and (4) represent the active and reactive power bal­
ance constraints, respectively. In this case, PGn (t) and QGn (t) are the active 
and reactive power generated in bus n in period t, respectively; PDn (t) 
and QDn (t) are the active and reactive power demand in bus n in period 
t, respectively; Pn (t) Qn (t) are the active and reactive power injections 
calculated in bus n in period t, respectively; and N is the set of indices of 
network nodes. 
Equations (5) and (6) represent the active and reactive power limits of the 
substations, where MinSEKP  and MaxSEKP  represent the minimum and maximum 
active power limits of substation k, respectively; MinSEKQ  and 
Max
SEKQ  repre­
sent the minimum and maximum reactive power limits of substation k, 
respectively; finally, ( )SEKP t  and ( )SEKQ t  represent the active and reac­
tive power provided by substation k in period t, respectively. Equation (7) 
represents the active power limits of the DG units, where MinGDjP and 
Max
GDjP
are the minimum and maximum active power limits of DG unit j. Equa­
tion (8) represents voltage limits, where MinnV  and MaxnV  are the minimum 
and maximum voltage limits in bus n; and ( )nV t  is the voltage of bus n 
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in period t. Equation (9) accounts for power flow limits, where lmnS is the 
power flow in the line connecting nodes n, m in period t, and MaxlmnS is the 
maximum power flow limit in the same line. 
( ) ( )
DGj
Max
t T j J t DGj DGj DGjc P tλ λ
∑ ∑
∈ ∈ ∆ −   (1)
Subject to:
( ), ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )DGj SEK
Min
P t P t t T k K t SEK SEK t T j J t DGj DGjt P t P tρ λ
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈∆ + ∆   (2)
 
Subject to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0; ,Gn Dn nP t P t P t n N t T− − = ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈   (3)
( ) ( ) ( ) 0; ,Gn Dn nQ t Q t Q t n N t T− − = ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈   (4)
( ) ; ,Min MaxSEk SEk SEkP P t P k K t T≤ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈   (5)
( ) ; ,Min MaxSEk SEk SEkQ Q t Q k K t T≤ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈   (6) 
( ) ; ,Min MaxDGj GDj DGjP P t P j J t T≤ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈   (7)
( ) ; ,Min Maxn n NV V t V n N t T≤ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈   (8)
( ) ; ,Max Maxlmn lmn lmn mnS S t S l L t T− ≤ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈   (9)
Power injections in equations (3) and (4) are given by equations (10)-(11) 
as shown below. In this case and are the real and imaginary parts of ele­
ment m, n of the admittance matrix, respectively; and is the angle between 
nodes m, n.
[ ]cos( ) sin( )θ θ∈= ∑ +n n n N m nm nm nm nmP V V bq   (10)
[ ]cos( ) sin( )θ θ∈= ∑ +n n n N m nm nm nm nmQ V V bq   (11)
Apparent power is given by its active and reactive components as shown 
in equations (12)-(14), where and are the active and reactive power flows 
in line connecting nodes n, m. 
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= +lmn lmn lmnS P jQ   (12)
cos( ) sin( )θ θ− −2lmn n nm n m nm nm n m nm nmP =V q V V q V V b   (13)
cos( ) sin( )θ θ+ −2lmn n nm n m nm nm n m nm nmQ =V b V V b V V q   (14)
Game theory basis 
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that studies strategic 
situations involving decision­making among individuals. This theory 
was initially developed as a tool to understand economic behavior [10]. 
However, since the 1970s game theory has been applied in various fields 
such as political science, war strategy, auctions, ethics, philosophy, and 
computer science. In a game, the welfare of a player depends not only 
upon his own actions, but also on the actions of the other participants. In 
normal form, an n person game can be defined as the three-tuple given by 
(15).
{N,(Xi ),(φi ),i∈N}  (15)
Where, N = {1, 2, 3… n} is the set of players (in this case the DG owners); 
Xi is the set of strategies of player i, (contract price offers); and φi is the 
payoff function of player i that assigns a real number to each element of 
the Cartesian product of the strategy space X1 x X2 x X3 ... x Xn. In this 
case, the Cartesian product represents all possible contract price offer 
combinations. For each of them, the payoff function, (that is, the profits of 
the DG units given by (1)), is obtained by solving the OPF­based economic 
dispatch described by (2)-(14). Subsequently, a payoff matrix is built and 
the specialized software GAMBIT [11] is used to find the Nash Equilibrium, 
in this point, no player can improve his individual payoff by unilaterally 
changing his current strategy. 
Illustrative example 
Consider the 10 bus distribution system depicted in Figure 2. This 
distribution system has two distributed generation units labeled as DG1 
and DG2 located at buses 2 and 10, respectively. Every DG unit has a 
capacity of 2 MW and an operation cost of 60 $/MWh. Suppose that the 
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wholesale market price is 60 $/MWh. For the sake of simplicity, without 
loss of generality, a single time interval will be considered. The demand 
of the distribution system, for every node is 1 MW with a lagging power 
factor of 0.948. The impedance is considered to be (0.001 +0.001j) ohm. 
1
2






Figure 2. 10­bus distribution system
Figure 3 illustrates the Locational Marginal Prices (LMP) of the distribution 
system without distributed generation. Such prices (given in $/h) 
correspond to the dual variables of the active power balance constraint 
(equation (3)) and represent the cost of providing an additional Megawatt 
to a particular bus. Note that despite of the fact that the wholesale market 
price is 60 $/MWh, the marginal prices of buses 8 to 10 are above 68$/h. 
This means that buying energy from these buses at any price lower than 
68$/MWh represents savings to the distribution company. 













Figure 3. Locational marginal prices
The contract price offer strategies of DG1 are: 62, 64 and 66 $/MWh; while 
those of DG2 are: 62, 64, 66, 68, and 70 $/MWh. For each combination of 
contract price offers a payoff is calculated (solving (1)­(9)) and the payoff 
matrix shown in Table 1 is obtained. The profits of DG1 and DG2 are given 
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in pairs. For example, the entry (4 – 8) means that the profits of DG1 and 
DG2 are $ 4 and $ 8, respectively. It can be observed that when DG1 and 
DG2 offer their energy at 62$/MWh the profits for each DG unit is $4. That 
is, every unit sells 2 MW at a price given by 62 $/MWh with operating costs 
of 60 $/MWh. Note that if DG1 and DG2 offer their energy at 66 and 70 $/
MWh, respectively, their profits are zero.
 
In this case, the Nash equilibrium can be found using the concept of 
dominance. A given strategy is said to be dominant if, no matter the 
strategies of the other players, the welfare obtained by choosing such 
strategy is always the highest. In this case, the dominant strategy for DG1 
is 64 $/MWh, with a minimum profit (in the worst case) of 4.8 $. A higher 
price offer of 66 $/MWh would result in zero profits (see last column of 
Table 1), while a lower one of 62 $/MWh would always result in profits of 
$ 4. Similarly, the dominant strategy for DG2 is 68 $/MWh. The intersection 
of the dominant strategies is the Nash equilibrium, marked with an 
asterisk in Table 1. In this point there is no incentive for any of the players 
to unilaterally change its strategy. It is worth to mention at this point that, 
finding a Nash equilibrium is not an easy task, since in many cases it is not 
always possible to identify dominant strategies. Consequently, in most 
cases, in order to find a Nash equilibrium it is necessary to solve a set 
of polynomial equations or use numerical methods [12]. Several factors 
might be responsible for the problem not having dominant strategies. Such 
factors include the number of players and strategies. The more strategies 
(or players, or both) the more difficult would be to find, for a given player, 
a strategy that would render maximum benefits no matter what the other 
players do. 
Table 1







DG2 offer: 62 $/MWh $ (4 - 4) $ (4.8-4) $ (0-4)
DG2 offer: 64 $/MWh $ (4 - 8) $ (4.8-8) $ (0­8)
DG2 offer: 66 $/MWh $(4 - 12) $ (4.8-12) $ (0-12)
DG2 offer: 68 $/MWh $ (4-12.8) $ (6.1-13.7)* $ (0­15.8)
DG2 offer: 70 $/MWh $ ( 4 - 0) $ (8 ­ 0 ) $ ( 0 ­ 0)
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In the following examples we proceed as follows: 
First, a set of strategies is defined for each DG owner. Such strategies 
are the contract price offers at which DG owners are willing to sell their 
energy. Then, for each combination of these strategies, the reaction of 
the distribution company is computed by solving the inner optimization 
problem (optimal power flow given by equations (2)-(9)). Once the inner 
optimization problem is solved, the profits of the DG owners are computed 
considering their production cost and the amount of energy sold. With 
the profits for each combination of strategies a payoff matrix, similar to 
the one presented in Table 1, is built. Such matrix is introduced to the 
software GAMBIT that computes the Nash equilibrium. 
4. TEST AND RESULTS
In order to show the applicability of the proposed approach, several tests 
were carried out with the 34 bus distribution system shown in Figure 4. 
The line data of this system can be consulted in [13]. Figure 5 depicts the 
load distribution of the system. Note that most of the load is concentrated 
in buses far away from the substation. The contract pricing of the DG units 
has been considered for one year. Figure 6 depicts the load duration curve 
of the expected demand and Figure 7 shows the wholesale market prices. 
Note that Figures 6 and 7 exhibit a similar shape. That is because higher 
prices on the wholesale market are expected to take place precisely during 



























Figure 4. 34-bus distribution system
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Figure 7. Wholesale market prices
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In order to illustrate the effect of competition on equilibrium prices, several 
tests were performed by changing the quantity and capacity of DG units.
Case 1. Two DG units
Initially, two DG units (labeled as DG1 and DG2) with operation costs 
of 60 $/MWh, located in buses 19 and 34, respectively, are considered. 
To illustrate the effect of DG size in equilibrium prices, four cases were 
analyzed with different DG sizes ranging from 0.5 MW to 2.0 MW. For each 
test, strategies ranging from 65 to 75 $/MWh, at intervals of 0.1 $/MWh, 
were considered. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the equilibrium contract prices and profits of the 
DG units obtained with the proposed approach. It can be observed in 
Table 2 that, as the size of the DG units increase, the contract equilibrium 
prices decrease. Also note that the contract price of DG2 (located in bus 
34) is always higher than the one of DG1. Consequently, DG2 always gets 
higher profits as can be observed in Table 3. This situation occurs because 
DG2 is located farther away from the substation than DG1, and given the 
load distribution of the network (see Figure 5), its contribution to power 
loss reduction and improvement of voltage profile is greater than the 
one provided by DG1. As a consequence, the distribution company has 
preference for DG2 when deciding over the dispatch of the DG units.
Table 2
Equilibrium contract prices for case 1
0.5 MW 1.0 MW 1.5 MW 2.0 MW
DG1 71.6 $/MWh 70.6 $/MWh 69.6 $/MWh 68.7 $/MWh
DG2 73.0 $/MWh 71.8 $/MWh 70.6 $/MWh 69.5 $/MWh
Table 3
Profits of the DG units for case 1
0.5 MW 1.0 MW 1.5 MW 2.0 MW
DG1 $ 12702.0 $ 23214.0 $ 31536.0 $ 37821.4
DG2 $ 14235.0 $ 25842.0 $ 34821.0 $ 41161.7
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Case 2. Three DG units
In this case we introduce a third DG unit in bus 14, labeled as DG3, and 
with the same production cost as the other two units. The new equilibrium 
contract prices and profits are shown in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. Note 
that, due to competition among the DG units, equilibrium prices, in all 
cases, are lower as compared with those shown in Table 2, consequently 
the profits of DG1 and DG2 also decrease as shown in Table 5.
Table 4
Equilibrium contract prices for case 2
0.5 MW 1.0 MW 1.5 MW 2.0 MW
DG1 71.0 $/MWh 69.8 $/MWh 68.6 $/MWh 67.3 $/MWh
DG2 72.5 $/MWh 71.0 $/MWh 69.5 $/MWh 68.2 $/MWh
DG3 70.0 $/MWh 69.0 $/MWh 68.0 $/MWh 67.1 $/MWh
Table 5
Profits of the DG units for case 2
0.5 MW 1.0 MW 1.5 MW 2.0 MW
DG1 $ 12045.0 $ 21462.0 $ 28251.0 $ 31974.0
DG2 $ 13687.5 $ 24090.0 $ 31207.5 $ 35916.0
DG3 $ 10950.0 $ 18898.2 $ 24811.2 $ 30673.5
Note that, in all cases, DG3 always gets the lowest contract price equilibrium 
and the lowest profits. That is because this unit has not been strategically 
located in the network. If DG3 had been positioned in a different bus, it 
might have gotten higher profits.
Case 3. Location and contract price equilibrium 
Cases 1 and 2 showed the importance of DG location in contract prices 
and profits. DG units located in strategic buses are able to obtain greater 
profits than DG units located in nonstrategic buses. Bearing this in mind, 
the location of the DG units has also been considered as part of the set of 
strategies. In this case, DG units compete among them to find the locations 
and contract prices that would render them maximum profits. 
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Including the location in the set of strategies significantly increases the 
combinations of strategies to be evaluated. Consequently, in order to limit 
the search space, only nodes from 20 to 34 are considered to be suitable 
for DG location. Also, the set of contract price offers is considered to vary 
from 65 to 70 $/MWh at intervals of 1 $/MWh. Such considerations reduce 
significantly the combination of strategies to be evaluated. Note that it is 
not reasonable to evaluate locations of DG near the substation, since their 
energy is more valuable when they contribute to the reduction of power 
losses. Such reduction is higher when DG units are located far from the 
substation or at the end of heavily loaded feeders. 
Tables 6 and 7 show the equilibrium contract prices and locations for two 
and three DG units, respectively. In both cases the capacity of the DG units 
is 2.0 MW and a production cost of 60 $/MWh is considered. Note that 
when the number of DG units increase from 2 to 3, the equilibrium contract 
prices reduce from 68 to 67 $/MWh. Such reduction is due to competition.
Table 6
Equilibrium contract prices and locations for two DG units
Bus Price ($/MWh) Profits ($)
GD1 24 68 39216.7
GD2 27 68 40327.4
Table 7
Equilibrium contract prices and locations for three DG units.
Bus Price ($/MWh) Profits ($)
GD1 24 67 32916.3
GD2 28 67 32617.8
GD3 29 67 32145.6
5.   CONCLUSIONS 
A game theory approach for the contract pricing evaluation of DG is 
presented. The proposed approach is envisaged under a market structure 
in which the distribution company can purchase energy either from the 
wholesale market or from the DG units located within its network. The 
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main contribution of the paper consists in the modeling of the DG energy 
trading using game theory concepts and a bilevel optimization framework. 
From a regulatory point of view, the proposed model provides efficient 
incentives to both, the distribution company and DG owner. This is because 
their objective functions have been explicitly considered in the model.
 
It was observed that when the size and/or number of DG units increases, 
the corresponding equilibrium contract prices reduce. It can be concluded 
that competition among DG units benefits the distribution company which 
can purchase energy at lower prices. Besides contract prices, it was shown 
that the proposed approach is suitable for considering also the location of 
the DG units. Future work will include other market structures as well as 
the active participation of demand. 
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